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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
extended to also favor post-petition interest. Such an amendment would, of
course, overrule the Saper decision, and, therefore, is not preferred. A more
desirable alternative would be to amend section 17 so as to specifically discharge
post-petition interest not paid out of the estate, while continuing the rule of
not discharging any unpaid principal. Thus, in the ordinary case, the debtor
will not be punished for the usual delays in bankruptcy over which he has
no control, and the Government will be in the same position in relation to
interest as general creditors.
There should, however, be one exception to the above suggestion. When the
estate is not sufficient to pay the entire principal of the tax claim, it would
seem that, at some time, interest should again begin to accrue on the unpaid
principal. The date of discharge would be an appropriate time for the com-
mencement of accrual. At this date, any further delay is not caused by law,
and the time of payment is within the debtor's control. The equities of allow-
ing interest to accrue after this date seem precisely the same as those which
justify the granting of interest to the date of payment on ordinary debts out
of bankruptcy.
It is submitted that this interest should be the only post-petition interest not
discharged.' 3 2 Bruning, of course, treated all post-petition interest in the same
manner, regardless of differing circumstances and equities. This is a result of
the present wording of the act which does not allow any such distinctions to
be made. Legislation pointing out the necessary refinements for the courts is
to be hoped for.
A CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF THE CONDITIONAL
VENDOR'S RIGHT TO RECLAMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate test of a creditor's security is its ability to withstand an attack
by a trustee in bankruptcy. In a Chapter XI proceeding the rights of a secured
creditor are not to be "affected," and in a Chapter X proceeding he is "pro-
tected" by the absolute-priority rule which requires that he be paid in full
132. An argument may be made for not discharging post-petition interest In one other
situation. Where the estate is not sufficient to pay the entire principal of the tax claim,
perhaps interest should run during bankruptcy on that part of the principal which was not
paid. Whether this amount should be classified with post-petition interest in general, or with
the interest that should be allowed on unpaid principal after bankruptcy, turns on whether
the delay caused by law or the insufficiency of the estate is the prime element In the
debtor's failure to make prompt payment. In effect, the Government probably will argue that
the policy reasons of fairness to the debtor should not apply when he could not have paid in
any event since the legal delays of bankruptcy are not working to his detriment. While this
argument is well-taken, it does not seem strong enough to violate the suggested rule of not
allowing any interest to accrue during bankruptcy proceedings.
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before any of the creditors in a lower ranking class are paid.1 As a practical
matter, however, his position is not as invulnerable as might first appear. He
may be enjoined, at the discretion of the court, from proceeding to enforce his
rights; he may be a member of a class which has voted to take less than the
members are entitled to; or the court may decide that his security cannot be
applied to his entire claim, in which case the remainder becomes an unsecured
debt.2 One method of circumventing these hazards is for the secured creditor
to reclaim his property. In 1935, by virtue of an ingenious juxtaposition of the
Bankruptcy Act and local sales law, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
In re Lake's Laundry, Inc.,3 afforded the conditional vendor this luxury. Since
that time, however, the Bankruptcy Act has undergone major revision. Further-
more, the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code has invited reas-
sessment of seasoned attitudes with respect to security and secured creditors.
In light of these developments, it is now not inappropriate to reopen the Lake's
Laundry decision.
II. THE Lake's Laundry CASE
In 1935, Lake's Laundry, Inc. filed a petition for corporate reorganization
pursuant to Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.- At the time, the company
was in possession of certain machinery which it held as conditional vendee. The
conditional sale contract provided that title was to remain in the vendor until
the price was paid.5 After reclamation had been granted to the conditional
vendor," the debtor appealed. The Second Circuit held that, under the word-
ng of the act,7 a plan of reorganization could deal only with the "property of
the debtor."'s Since the conditional sale contract, unlike chattel mortgages,
reserved title in the vendor, the machinery was not "property of the debtor"3
and, hence, not intended by Congress to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in a reorganization.' 0
1. 1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured Tramactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9.02[2][al at 979 (1963).
2. Id. § 9.02[21[a] at 979, [b] at 931.
1 3. 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
4. Bankruptcy Act § 77B, ch. 424, 43 Stat. 912 (1934) (nov.' Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-
276, 52 Stat. 8S3 (193S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964)).
5. Hereinafter it vil1 be assumed throughout the discussion that the conditional sale
contract contains a title retention clause.
6. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 237 (S.DN.Y. 1935).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 77B(b)(10), ch. 424, 43 Stat. 914 (1934) (now Bankruptcy Act
§ 216(2), 52 Stat. 896 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 616(2) (1964)).
3. 79 F.2d at 327-23.
9. Similarly, "the reservation of an option, not exercised, to redeem certificatcs issued
against a mortgage . . 2', does not make the mortgage itself property of the debtor, In re
National Pub. Serv. Corp., 3S F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denieJ, 301
U.S. 697 (1937), citing In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 79 F.2d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 1935); nor is
itock of the debtor's subsidiary, which is held by the debtor, property of the debtor, s e
In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., S0 F.2d S49, 851 (2d Cir. 19.36).
10. In arriving at its decision, the court was influenced by the fact that Congrecs had
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Five years later, in In re White Plains Ice Serv., Inc.," the court of ap-
peals retreated from the outer limits of Lake's Laundry.12 In White Plains,
limitations were built around the "title theory" and its resulting right of
reclamation, demonstrating, as Judge Clark stated in his concurring opinion,
that "in practice In re Lake's Laundry, Inc. . . . does not force as prompt a
surrender of possession to a conditional vendor as some commentators have
thought, and that power does exist in a reorganization court to make such
stays as are not unreasonable in the light of the vendor's legal priority."13
Although the White Plains decision is usually taken at face value, i.e., for the
proposition that a conditional vendor is entitled to reclaim subject only to
reasonable delay, the decision could operate quite easily to undermine the
doctrine of Lake's Laundry in its entirety. By staying the vendor's right to
reclaim, albeit for a reasonable time, the White Plains court impliedly ad-
mitted that a reorganization court has jurisdiction over property subject to a
conditional sale. This certainly contradicts-and implicitly overrules-the
"jurisdiction theory" of Lake's Laundry.14 Nonetheless, the conditional vendor's
right to reclaim has continued to be recognized on the Lake's Laundry decision's
alternate ground, the "title theory."' 5
specifically included conditional sales in the farm reorganization portion of the act,
Bankruptcy Act § 75(o)(6), ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1473 (1933), but not in the corporate re-
organization section which was cast in more general terms, Bankruptcy Act § 77B(c)(10),
ch. 424, 48 Stat. 917 (1934) (now Bankruptcy Act § 113, 52 Stat. 884, 11 U.S.C. § 513
(1964)). 79 F.2d at 328. These sections dealt with the power of the court to stay pending
judicial proceedings attempting to deal with property involved in the reorganization
proceedings. The court reasoned that, if it could not enjoin proceedings dealing with
conditionally sold property, such property must be outside the realm of reorganization.
Ibid. Issue was taken with this conclusion by Judge Learned Hand, who pointed out In
his dissenting opinion that the corporate reorganization section speaks only of liens, "surely
the most comprehensive of words." Id. at 329.
11. 109 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940).
12. Although the Chandler Act became effective in 1938, it retained all the provisions
of the 1898 act here pertinent. Further, while the White Plains case involved a petition
under Chapter XI, the debtor-in-possession chapter, neither that court nor any subsequent
court drew any distinction between corporate and non-corporate proceedings in this regard.
13. 109 F.2d at 915 (concurring opinion). (Footnote omitted.) The stay was originally
granted to permit a determination of the status of the property, and was continued to
fix the amount actually owing to the vendor and to give the debtor a reasonable time to
pay it. But this was "all the grace the debtor can possibly claim . . . ." Id. at 915 (con-
curring opinion). This result had been predicted in In re Burgemeister Brewing Co., 84
F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1936) (per curiam), where the court, after holding that the conditional
vendor was entitled to reclamation from a reorganization vendee, stated: "What is said here
is not intended to limit the power of a court of equity with jurisdiction of the res, to deter-
mine when and in what manner one seeking to recover a part of such res shall enforce his
remedy." Id. at 389.
14. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
15. See Barth Equip. Co. v. Perlstein, 128 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1942); In the Matter
of Newjer Contracting Co., 154 F. Supp. 567 (D.N.J. 1957); In re Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp.
548 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th
Cir. 1952).
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Yet, as Judge Learned Hand, in Lake's Laundry, pointed out-lamenting the
"barren distinction" between chattel mortgages and conditional salesc-the
majority opinion would surely "prevent the reorganization of many... smaller
companies who get their capital in this way."'' 7 Consider, for example, a taxicab
company which has gone into reorganization, only to have its cabs reclaimed
by the conditional vendor. In this extreme example, the debtor, left with no
business to reorganize, would be forced into straight bankruptcy. More com-
mon are cases where conditionally sold property is so essential to the con-
tinued operation of the business that reclamation constitutes the deciding
factor in determining whether reorganization succeeds or fails.Ys Nevertheless,
subject only to the court's interpretation of "reasonable delay,"' 0 the debtor
may still be deprived of possession while most in need of the property.
I. THE BANmuRPcY AcT
Thirty-one years later, it is difficult to justify Lake's Laundry's reverential
treatment of the conditional sale contract by recourse to any intent of Congress
express or implied in the Bankruptcy Act itself. A detailed examination of the
act leads almost inevitably to Judge Hand's solitary conclusion that "'titl e' is
a formal word for a purely conceptual notion . .."-' and that Congress did
not intend to isolate or sanctify the security of a conditional sale transaction.'-
A. Reorganization Proceedings
Influenced by the serious financing problems confronting many of the
nation's smaller aircraft companies, Congress, in 1957, provided that condi-
tional vendors of certain types of aircraft and related equipment would not
be affected by a corporate reorganization if they specifically retained the right
to repossess in the conditional sale contract. -
Congress evidently felt that this additional protection would encourage
manufacturers and dealers to extend credit to such companies.P Previously,
16. 79 F.2d at 328 (dissenting opinion).
17. Id. at 329 (dissenting opinion).
1S. See In re Sun Cab Co., 67 F. Supp. 137, 139 (D.D.C. 1946). Compare In re Adolf
Gobel, Inc., S0 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936). Advancing the position in favor of retaining the
Lake's Laundry rule intact, the Gobel court stated: "The argument that section 77B has
for its object reorganization, and grants to the court power to enjoin any action in the
state court which renders reorganization more difficult, is ... without merit.... Though
facility in reorganization is deirable, it is not the sole consideration." Id. at 852-53.
19. Power & Combustion, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 F.2d 937, 940 nA (4th Cir. 1962) (rcason-
able time not to exceed thirty to sixty days absent extraordinary circumstances); In the
Matter of Nev.Jer Contracting Co., 154 F. Supp. 567 (D.NJ. 1957).
20. 79 F.2d at 32S (dissenting opinion).
21. Id. at 329 (dissenting opinion).
22. Bankruptcy Act § 116(5), 71 Slat. 617 (1957), 11 U.SC. § 51615) (19W). Under
this provision, the contract, in addition to providing for the retntion of title, vouhl a o
have to state specifically that the property therein described was not to be subject to any
subsequent reorganization in which the vendee might become involved.
23. H.R. Rep. No. 944, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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such protection had been afforded to one other type of property, rolling-stock
equipment.2 4
Two conclusions follow. First, had Congress intended, as Lake's Laundry
contended, to "exclude [from reorganization proceedings] property in the
possession of the debtor whose rights therein were only those of a conditional
vendee,'25 there would have been no need to legislate anew for the benefit
of these particular industries. Secondly, if the right to repossess flowed auto-
matically from the conditional sale contract itself, as Lake's Laundry implied,
the addition of a condition precedent of specifically reserving this right in the
contract would serve to impose rather than to relieve burdens on hard pressed
vendors.
B. In General
While other sections of the act do not directly concern reclamation within
reorganization proceedings, the history of these sections persuasively points
to a definite legislative intent inconsistent with that enunciated in Lake's
Laundry.
1. The Voidable Preference
In 1915, Bailey v. Baker Ice Macl. Co.26 established that a conditional sale
could not be a voidable preference under the act as the statute then existed.
The act defined preference as "a transfer of any of his [the debtor's]
property, and the effect of the enforcement of such . . . transfer will be to
enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
any other of such creditors of the same class."'27 Transfer was defined as "the
sale and every other and different mode of disposing of or parting with property,
or the possession of property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment, pledge,
mortgage, gift, or security. '28 Hence, if there were no transfer of the debtor's
property, there could be no preference and, a fortiori, no voidable preference.
The Bailey court interpreted such words as "disposing of" and "parting
with" as requiring an act by the debtor; failing to find the requisite act in
a conditional sale, the court found no transfer and, thus, no preference.2 9 This
reasoning,30 fettered by a restrictive definition of "property of the debtor," if
allowed to continue, would emasculate the powers of the trustee to collect
the bankrupt estate.31
24. Bankruptcy Act § 77(j), 49 Stat. 922 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 205(j) (1964).
25. 79 F.2d at 328.
26. 239 U.S. 268 (1915).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 60a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898) (amended by 52 Stat. 869 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1964)).
28. Bankruptcy Act § 1(25), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 545 (1898) (now Bankruptcy Act § 1(30),
52 Stat. 842 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964)).
29. 239 U.S. at 274.
30. See also In re Johnson, 282 Fed. 273 (N.D. Iowa 1922); In re Bennett, 264 Fed.
533 (W.D. Mo. 1920).
31. E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70, 52 Stat. 869, 875, 879 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, 110 (1964). It should be noted at this point that all of these provisions are
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Thus, as part of the sweeping revisions in the act made in 1938, the
definition of transfer was changed to read:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct or
indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or w-ith an interest therein or
with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest there-
in, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial
proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, en-
cumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise .... 32
Unfortunately, this amendment did not convince everyone that a conditional
sale was capable of being a voidable preference, 3 although, on the strength
of this broader definition, the holding of Bailey was to some extent avoided.
With the avowed purpose of clarifying any latent ambiguities remaining after
1938,- 5 the definition was subsequently amended in 1952 to provide that "the
retention of a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed
a transfer suffered by such debtor." 33
One of the essential elements of a voidable preference is the diminution of
the bankrupt's estate 37 Thus, once it is conceded that a conditional sale can
be a voidable preference, a conditional sale, by definition, must include the
element of diminution. If the removal of property constitutes a diminution of
the bankrupt's estate, the property must have been part of his estate to begin
with, or, in other words, "property of the debtor." Significantly, prior to either
amendment, Judge Learned Hand had advocated to no avail in Lake's Laundry,
which was a section 77B proceeding, the adoption by the court of a definition
of "property" which would "include all legally protected interests" of the
debtor.3s Of course, once conditionally sold property is recognized as "property
of the debtor," Lake's Laundry collapses.
contained in the straight bankruptcy (Chapters I-VII) portions of the act. However, they
are all applicable to Chapter X corporate reorganizations. Sections 60 and 7Mc are made
expressly applicable, and § 70e is dearly impliedly applicable. 4 Collier S 70.4316], .69, at
1517-18.
32. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 52 Stat. 342 (193S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
33. See 2 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 518 (rev. ed. 1940).
34. Cf. Corn Exch. Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 313 U.S. 434, 433 n.U (1943).
35. 'Notwithstanding the apparently sweeping language of the present [1933] definition
of transfer, there is a chance that it would be held insufficient to cover the security interest
reserved in the grantor by conditional sale ... transaction vith the debtor, because such
interests are not the results of transfers made by the debtor, although they usually perform
the same function as a transfer made by him for the purpose of security. Bailey v. Baker
Ice Machine Co.... held that a conditional sale to the debtor could not be a preferential
transfer, because it was not made by the debtor. Since the amendment of section C0, it is
clear that a preferential transfer may be suffered by the debtor, but the generality of the
present [193S] definition is clarified by the declaration that such a reserved interest may
be a transfer suffered by the debtor." H.PR. Rep. No. 2320, S2d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
36. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
37. 3 Collier U 60.20 and cases cited therein.
38. 79 F.2d at 329 (dissenting opinion).
19661 COMMENTS
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
2. Section 70
Nowhere else in the act does the unique status afforded a conditional vendor
under Lake's Laundry find congressional endorsement. Thus, under subdivision
c of section 70,39 the trustee is put into the position of a hypothetical
judgment lien creditor. If, under the appropriate state law, a judgment lien
creditor prevails over the vendor, then the trustee also prevails. 40 Similarly,
under section 70e(1) ,41 if there is a creditor in existence' 2 against whom the
failure to perfect renders the reservation of title ineffective, then the trustee
may avoid the transaction and retain the property regardless of any attempt at
reclamation. 43 Lake's Laundry notwithstanding, it is the observance of the
technicality of perfection, rather than a retention of title provision in the
contract, which renders the conditional sale-and any other security interest-
invulnerable to attack.44
C. The Effect on Lake's Laundry
Considering the manifest intent of Congress to legislate away distinctions
between conditional sales and other forms of security,45 except in two cases
involving unusual economic situations, 46 it is remarkable that Lake's Laundry
is accepted without serious challenge.47 Can it be that the courts since 1935,
with an excess of conservatism, have been reluctant to create an inference
from the establishment of a voidable preference, not before the court, to hold
that conditionally sold property should be considered "property of the debtor"
in all contexts?48 It would seem that, in the absence of any declared con-
39. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
40. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Earhart v. Callan,
221 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955).
41. Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1) (1964).
42. Section 70c does not require that such a creditor actually exist.
43. This is a very brief discussion of an immensely complicated topic which is beyond
the scope of this comment. See generally 4 Collier iff 70.19, .57, .84.
44. The fact that the states have diverse recording statutes has led to great non-uni-
formity in the application of the Bankruptcy Act. Hence, the doctrine of Lake's Laundry
may allow a vendor in New York to reclaim his property, while a vendor under an
identical contract in Kentucky would be denied reclamation. See 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 419,
422-23 (1936).
45. See note 35 supra.
46. See notes 22 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
47. Cf. Power & Combustion, Inc. v. Wilson, 298 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1962); Mickel-
Hopkins, Inc. v. Frassinetti, 278 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1960).
48. Of course, a court can deny a petition for reclamation in cases involving a defective
perfection under § 70, without ever reaching the question of "property of the debtor";
or find a preference and deny the petition without ever looking beyond the face of the
statute. Nevertheless, a court presented with a petition for reclamation which cannot be
defeated as improperly recorded or as a voidable preference could find cogent reasons In
the act to deny a petition which threatens an otherwise promising reorganization. It is In
this context that the doctrine of Lake's Laundry will probably meet its ultimate demise.
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gressional intent, the history of "transfer" in bankruptcy law,4 9 undermining
the "barren distinction" between conditional sales and other forms of securityPao
coupled with the recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Act dealing with air-
craft and rolling-stock equipment,0 ' raises a strong presumption that Lake's
Laundry is no longer reliable as a barometer of legislative intent or a delineator
of the boundaries of "property of the debtor."
IV. THE INFEpmcE FRom STATE LAW--THE UNIFORM COmmRCIL CODE
The determination of the quality of the security which a creditor holds and
related problems are all governed by state law in bankruptcy proceedings. 2
When Lake's Laundry was decided, the distinction between conditional sales
and other types of security interests was sanctioned by a long history of
statutory and common law.53 That this distinction is still valid in the
majority of states which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code is a
proposition of considerable doubt.
A. Section 9-102
By definition, article 9 "applies to security interests created by contract in-
cluding pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title reten-
tion contract . . . intended as security." 35 In a move reminiscent of the
development of the meaning of "transfer" in the Bankruptcy Act,00 this section
seeks to obliterate obfuscating legal distinctions in any transaction creating
a "security interest" regardless of the terminology chosen by the parties them-
selves.57 Since the Lake's Laundry court ostensibly credited its preferred treat-
ment of the conditional vendor to state law,8 a bankruptcy court following
that decision in a state which has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code is on
an anachronistic doctrinal perch.
B. Section 9-202
The most cogent reason for the ultimate demise of Lake's Laundr is codified
by another section of article 9 which provides that "each provision of this
49. It should be noted that "transfer" also appears in §§ 67 and 70 of the act. 52 Stat.
875, S79 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110 (1964). The changes of the definition
discussed in notes 27-3s and accompanying text also apply to these sections and helped to
codify the already existing law that conditional sales were within their scope.
50. 79 F.2d at 328-29 (dissenting opinion).
51. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
52. 4 Collier r 70.19, at 1122. However, the bankruptcy court is not bound to follow
state law where the court deems state law to be in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
1 70.06, at 977.
53. 79 F.2d at 32S.
54. As of January 1, 1966, 30 states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
55. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-102(2). (Emphasis added.)
56. See notes 23, 32, 35 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
57. In re Jeavons, -F. Supp. -(ND. Ohio 1965).
58. 79 F.2d at 32S.
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